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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pastors of churches and other clergypersons, who have been 
involved in private counseling, have been especially susceptible to 
lawsuits alleging clergy malpractice and other significant torts.1  
Churches and other religious institutions are being subjected to suits 
based on vicarious liability and/or direct liability in connection with tort 
claims against pastors and other employees hired by these institutions.2  
 
 1. See, e.g., Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
2009) (claims against a priest for breach of fiduciary duty and against a bishop and diocese alleging 
negligent retention and supervision); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009) (complaint filed 
against a church diocese, bishops and others alleging breach of fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, 
and negligent hiring, supervision and retention); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007) 
(claims against pastor, church, and elders for professional negligence, defamation, intentional 
infliction of mental distress, and other actions after the termination of a counseling relationship 
between claimant and the pastor); Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. 
Div. 2004), aff’d, 794 N.Y.S.2d 282 (claims against a pastor and church officials asserting clergy 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884 
So.2d 747 (Miss. 2004) (en banc) (suit against a priest, church and diocese alleging clergy 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, 
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and negligent retention and supervision); 
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) (action for 
clerical malpractice); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (suit against a pastor and 
church averring professional negligence, negligent infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and a statutory violation); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 
(Cal. 1988) (claims against a church and church-related counselors alleging wrongful death based 
on “clergyman malpractice” and outrageous conduct); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. 
App.1987) (claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and others). 
 2. See, e.g., Chenevert v. Redemptorists/Denver Province, No. 09-473-JJB, 2010 WL 
1609971 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2010) (alleging vicarious liability against a Catholic church for the 
harm sustained as a result of sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest-claims of direct liability were also 
made against the church for negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary 
duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of 
Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010) 
(asserting direct liability against a Catholic Diocese for sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest arising 
from the negligent hiring, supervision and retention of the priest, as well as breach of fiduciary 
duty); Gray v. Darby, No. 08-CV-02527, 2009 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E. D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009) 
(asserting the application of respondeat superior or vicarious liability to a church and its regional 
Conference and District Superintendent for various torts and statutory violations of an acting pastor 
at a school and childcare facility positioned on the church’s premises); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 
401 (Mass. 2009) (alleging vicarious liability; negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and other 
claims against a diocese and several bishops); In re Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of Tucson, 
No. CV 06-373-TUC-MHM, 2008 WL 509386 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2008) (alleging the liability of a 
diocese based on the doctrine of respondeat superior—vicarious liability—and several other 
claims); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009) 
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A primary goal of all religious institutions should be to develop 
strategies of minimizing their liability for church-related counseling 
services for the protection of the church and the parishioner, which are 
addressed extensively in Part V of this article. 
Counseling provided by a pastor may be nonsecular or religious, 
thereby focusing on the provision of biblical or spiritual advice.  
Conversely, the pastor’s counseling may be secular or professional, 
which would not involve religious advice.  Whether the advice is 
nonsecular or secular, the pastor or other church official, who harms a 
parishioner or non-parishioner, may be sued for damages due to clergy 
malpractice in connection with such counseling.3  Courts, however, have 
historically declined to allow recovery in torts cases in which the matter 
to be resolved entailed a religious dispute as opposed to a secular 
conflict.4  This avoidance of religious disputes by the courts is based on 
the First Amendment Establishment and/or Free Exercise Clause, also 
referred to as the religion clauses.5 
Civil claims against clergypersons, asserting malpractice in 
connection with spiritual ministry, spiritual counseling, and/or pastoral 
counseling, have been litigated in at least the last thirty years under the 
guise of clergy malpractice.6  The courts, however, have recognized a 
 
(alleging the negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a diocese and a bishop); Schovanec 
v. Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, 188 P.3d 158 (Okla. 2008) as corrected, (July 2, 2008); Doe v. 
Liberatore, 478 F. Supp.2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (alleging vicarious liability; negligent hiring, 
supervision and retention; and other actions against a diocese, a church bishop, a monk, and a 
second priest); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747 (Miss. 2004) (pleading the 
negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a church and diocese, as well as other tort causes 
of action); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (averring 
negligent supervision of a pastor by the regional district of a church); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. 
Supp.2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (claiming 
negligent supervision of a priest by an archdiocese); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1998) 
(asserting negligent supervision and retention of a clergyperson by a church and other ecclesiastical 
bodies); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997) (alleging 
negligent supervision of a priest by a church); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 
654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997) (pleading negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a 
diocese); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (alleging negligent retention and 
supervision of a pastor by a religious governing body). 
 3. See infra Sections III, IV, and accompanying notes. 
 4. See infra Section IV. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Seemingly, there are no records prior to 1980 of any cases in which clergy malpractice 
was asserted.  The complaint in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 
1988), was originally filed on March 31, 1980 entitled “COMPLAINT FOR CLERGYMAN 
MALPRACTICE:  WRONGFUL DEATH, NEGLIGENCE, OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT . . . .” 
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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number of suits against churches regarding nondoctrinal, as well as 
doctrinal issues, for over a century.7  Furthermore, it appears there has 
been an increase in the number of tort actions against clerics and 
religious establishments for professional or clergy misconduct since 
1980.8  According to one writer, a reason for this apparent escalation 
may be the fact that fundamentalist churches are providing more 
personal, spiritual, and psychological counseling to parishioners and 
 
 7. The following cases involve spiritual and nonspiritual-related complaints against church 
officials, churches, and other religious institutions or organizations.  See, e.g., Doe v. Brouillette, 
906 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Hyde Park Baptist Church v. Turner, No. 03-07-00437-CV, 
2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 2009); K. J. v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Stockton, No. C058034, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 538 (Cal. App. Apr. 10, 2009); Gray v. Darby, No. 
08-CV-02527, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009); Marmelstein v. Kehillat 
New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 2008); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake 
City, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007); Bear Valley Church of Christ, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (en 
banc); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 
P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Fisher v. Northmoor United Methodist Church, 679 S.W.2d 305 (Mo.Ct. 
App.1984); Morgan v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 402 So.2d 640 (La. 1981); Helton v. Forest 
Park Baptist Church, 589 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Battig v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., 482 F.Supp. 338 (W.D.La. 1977), aff’d, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979); Coolbaugh v. St. Peter’s 
Roman Catholic Church, 115 A.2d 662 (Conn. 1955); Sullivan v. First Presbyterian Church 
Waterloo, 152 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1967); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred 
Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 186 N.E. 798 (N.Y. 1933); Hudson v. Church of The Holy Trinity, 166 
N.E. 306 (N.Y. 1929); Magnuson v. O’Dea, 135 P. 640 (Wash. 1913); Whittaker v. Sandford, 85 A. 
399 (Me. 1912); Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 110 N.W. 951 (Mich. 1907); 
Hellstern v. Katzer, 79 N.W. 429 (Wis. 1899); Davis v. Central Congregational Soc., 129 Mass. 
367, 1880 WL 10838 (1880). 
 8. The list below contains examples of professional or clergy misconduct cases decided since 
1980 when the complaint was originally filed in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 
763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).  The Nally case involved a wrongful death claim asserting clergy 
malpractice against a Protestant church and four of its pastors.  Additional examples of clergy 
misconduct cases include:  Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Strock v. 
Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en 
banc); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993); Schieffer v. 
Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907 (1993); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 
928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (en banc); F. G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997); Sanders v. 
Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri 
Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Richelle v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct. 
App. 2003), as modified, Mar. 17, 2003; Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 
(App. Div. 2004); Vione v. Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 
F.Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007),; Marmelstein 
v. Kehillat New Hempstead:  The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 
2008); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009); 
Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 
765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Mallory v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. 
X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL 765485 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Gray v. Darby, No. 
08-CV-02527, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 
401 (Mass. 2009).  
4
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others.9  This movement by fundamentalist churches toward greater 
involvement in the field of psychological counseling, as well as the 
litigious nature of society, indicates a possible increase in future clergy 
malpractice litigation.10  Churches in general appear to be providing 
more counseling services to their congregants.  Consequently, many 
pastor-counselee relationships have resulted in negligent pastoral and/or 
professional counseling, thereby engendering a number of lawsuits.  
These lawsuits involving negligent counseling and other significant tort 
claims include: assertions of negligent counseling by a protestant 
minister resulting in a parishioner’s suicide;11 negligent marital 
counseling resulting in a sexual relationship between a Roman Catholic 
priest and a parishioner;12 disclosure of confidential communications by 
an ordained Baptist minister to church officials and parishioners;13 
defamation of a parishioner-counselee by a pastor after the parishioner 
terminated their marital counseling relationship;14 invasion of privacy by 
a pastor who agreed to provide family counseling to a husband and wife 
and their children;15 and various other tort actions.16  It has been 
recommended that churches and other religious organizations use 
protective measures to minimize their liability for church-related 
 
 9. Lawrence M. Burek, Note, Clergy Malpractice:  Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower 
Power, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (1986).  
 10. Id. 
 11. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). 
 12. See Destafano v. Grabrian, 729 P.2d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc). 
 13. See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 14. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
 15. See Barnett, 723 S.W.2d at 544 See also Schauer v. Diocese of Green Bay, No. 
2007AP1262, 2008 WL 2097379 (Wis. App. May 20, 2008) (claims made by plaintiff against a 
priest and Diocese alleging sexual abuse of the plaintiff—when he was a student—during a 
counseling session with the priest). 
 16. See, e.g., Chenevert v. Redemptorists/Denver Province, No. 09-473-JJB, 2010 WL 
1609971 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2010) (alleging negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, 
breach of fiduciary duty,  negligent misrepresentation, and fraud); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for 
The Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
May 27, 2010) (alleging negligence of Diocese in hiring, supervising and retaining a priest who 
sexually abused minors, and breach of fiduciary duty for failure to investigate, warn, and protect 
against abuse); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty, 
negligent conduct, and vicarious liability); K. J. v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, No. 
C058034, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 538 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2009) (alleging negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and constructive fraud); Hyde Park Baptist Church v. 
Turner, No. 03-07-00437-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009) (asserting 
intentional torts and negligence); Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 
2008) (claiming negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and other causes of action); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (claiming 
assault, battery, negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, and other actions). 
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counseling services.17  Church members and others who seek counseling 
from pastors and professional counselors, who offer counseling services 
at churches and other theological establishments, will also benefit from 
these protective devices.  It is important that churches consider the 
suggestions outlined in Part V of this article focusing on such things as:  
conducting background investigations to determine the experience, 
credentials, criminal history and overall character of a pastor or 
counselor applicant; creating a pastoral counseling policy for the church; 
making sure that the pastoral counselor emphasizes biblical counseling; 
employing a written counseling agreement; referring parishioners to 
professional counselors when appropriate; avoiding particular 
counseling situations; keeping thorough records of counseling sessions; 
and adhering to state licensing laws applicable to professional 
counselors.  These and other helpful recommendations are addressed in 
more detail in Part V as positive methods of minimizing church liability 
and ultimately shielding the parishioner from unnecessary harm. 
Part II of this article presents a discussion of the clergyperson’s 
duty of care to parishioners.  Part III addresses clergy malpractice, which 
focuses on negligent pastoral counseling and judicial analyses of such 
claims.  Part IV examines First Amendment defenses to clergy 
malpractice and other tort claims against pastors, churches and other 
religious organizations with emphasis on the religion clauses.  Finally, 
Part V suggests various methods of minimizing liability for church-
related counseling services. 
II.  THE CLERGYPERSON’S DUTY OF CARE 
As with other negligence claims, duty of care is a required element 
of proof in a clergy malpractice action.18  A defendant will not be subject 
to liability for negligence unless the injured complainant can prove the 
existence of a duty to use reasonable care, that there was a breach of that 
duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately or legally caused the 
damage.19  A duty is “a legally sanctioned obligation” owed by one 
person to another.20  For instance, the court in one clergy malpractice 
 
 17. See infra section V. 
 18. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 955-56 (Cal. 1988) 
 19. Id. at 956; Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Mass. 2009).  See also Mabus v. St. 
James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884 So.2d 747, 764 (Miss. 2004) (en banc) (stating in order 
“[to] prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
each of the elements of negligence:  duty, breach, causation and injury”). 
 20. STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 148 (1984). 
6
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case21 identified several factors that must be weighed in deciding 
whether a duty of care is in fact present in a given case.22  Those factors 
comprise the following: 
[F]oreseeability of harm to [the injured party], the degree of certainty 
that [he] suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between 
[defendants’] conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to [defendants], the policy of preventing future harm, the 
extent of the burden to the defendant[s] and consequences to the 
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability 
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for 
the risk involved.23 
Standard of care is one component of legal duty.24  A complainant 
must identify the applicable standard of care in a malpractice case in 
order to present appropriate evidence to the judge and/or jury concerning 
the required conduct of a defendant.25  Standard of care pertains to the 
behavior or conduct required of an individual in a given situation.26  The 
reasonable person standard is basic and has been defined as “that degree 
of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise under the 
same or similar circumstances.”27  It has been stated that professionals 
and persons who engage in work requiring special skills must exercise a 
standard of minimum skill, knowledge, ability, training, and competence 
possessed by members of that profession, trade, or calling in good 
standing, in addition to exercising reasonable and ordinary care in what 
they do.28  Suits against religious establishments and clergypersons have 
addressed the applicability of the professional standard to this unique 
group, as well as issues germane to the clergy malpractice cause of 
 
 21. Nally, 763 P.2d at 948.  
 22. Id. at 956.  For additional court analyses of the duty of care element in the context of other 
clergy malpractice claims, see Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 
198, 204-06 (Utah 2001); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1430-34 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 23. Nally, 763 P.2d at 956. 
 24. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (5th ed. 
1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 270 (2000). 
 25. See, e.g.,  DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 24, at 631-33.  
 26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 164-208; DOBBS, supra note 24, at 270, 275-79; 
STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., 2A THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:4, at 525-35 (2009). 
 27. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS DICTIONARY 713 (1985).  
 28. STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., 4 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 15.1, at 453-54 (2009).  
See also DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683-84 (addressing clergy malpractice, one type of professional 
negligence); KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 185; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 168-96 (11th ed. 2005). 
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action.29  Consequently, if a court determines that the professional 
standard applies in a case, the clergy professional may be held liable for 
damages if the court finds that his or her conduct has not conformed to 
what a reasonable, prudent, competent professional would have done 
under similar circumstances.30 
III.  CLERGY MALPRACTICE:  NEGLIGENT PASTORAL COUNSELING 
A.  Defining Clergy Malpractice 
 
Clergy malpractice is one of many types of professional liability 
actions.  Professional liability pertains to actions brought against 
professional persons in their capacity as professionals.31  The 
malpractice of a professional, such as a clergyperson, may be described 
generally as “the negligence of a professional in the exercise of that 
profession.”32  Therefore, in order for liability to be imposed on a 
professional person, there must be “an act by a person who, [while] 
engaging in a particular profession under license or other privilege, fails 
to exercise the required care and skill reasonably required of like 
professionals; and who, by virtue of that negligence, causes . . . injury to 
the person to whom the professional duty is owed.”33  A claim for clergy 
malpractice generally pertains to negligent “pastoral counseling and is 
based on the alleged wrongful conduct or advice of the clergy member in 
causing the situation presented for counseling to deteriorate further.”34  
 
 29. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Franco v. The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 
2007); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Milla v. 
Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) 
(en banc); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); 
Strata v. Patin, 545 So.2d 1180 (La. App. 1989); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984). 
 30. See, e.g., MARTIN WEINSTEIN, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 522-23 (1988); Dausch v. 
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 31. John W. Wade, An Overview of Professional Negligence, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 
465-66 (1987). 
 32. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 522.  See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991) 
(describing “clergy malpractice” focusing on the standard of care component of such a claim); see 
generally DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683-84. 
 33. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 522.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A 
(1965); DOBBS, supra note 24, at 681-88.  
 34. Louis A. Frumer and Melvin I. Friedman, Religious Organizations and Institutions, 
Personal Injury—Actions, Defenses, Damages, § 117.04 [2][c] (MB) (2010).  One case described 
clergy malpractice as “the failure to exercise the degree of care and skill normally exercised by 
members of the clergy in carrying out their professional duties.”  Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 
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586 (Ohio 1991).  See, e.g., Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009).  In the Petrell case, a 
female parishioner sued a church and three bishops for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring 
and retention, and other wrongful acts.  The parishioner claimant sought marriage counseling from 
the parish rector, and he initiated a sexual relationship with the parishioner which resulted in her 
filing for divorce.  Id. at 404-05. Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 
2008).  In Marmelstein, a claim was filed by the claimant who was enticed into a sexual relationship 
with an Orthodox Jewish rabbi during a period that he was counseling the claimant concerning 
various personal, financial, and legal problems.  The claimant alleged intentional and negligent 
infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent retention of the rabbi on 
the part of the synagogue.  Id.  at 376-77.  Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).   In 
the Westbrook case, a former parishioner, who had been receiving marital counseling from the 
church pastor, sued the pastor and other officials for professional negligence, defamation, 
intentional infliction of mental distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.  Id.  at 392-94.  Vione v. 
Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).  The parishioner complainant sued his former 
minister-counselor, the church, and others, seeking damages due to an affair the minister was having 
with the parishioner’s wife while the couple was receiving marriage counseling.  Id. at 683-84.  
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).  In the Hester case, a complaint was filed 
by a husband and wife alleging six causes of action, including ministerial malpractice.  Id. at 549.  
Among other things, the plaintiffs sought damages from the defendant, a clergyman, for negligent 
counseling.  Id. at 549-50, 554.  See also Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988).  In 
Strock, the court relied on Hester and dismissed a clergy malpractice suit against a Lutheran 
minister, who was accused of participating in a voluntary sexual relationship with the plaintiff’s 
wife.  Id. at 1236, 1239-40.  The plaintiff and his wife were receiving marital counseling from the 
minister.  Id. at 1236.   
  The following articles address the subject of clergy malpractice and/or other clergy-
related issues:  Freddie Baird, Tyla Law for the Clergy Conference:  Avoiding Legal Landmines, 60 
TEX. B. J. 344 (1997); Burek, supra note 9; Steven Chase, Clergy Malpractice:  The Cause of 
Action That Never Was, 18 N.C. CENT. L. J. 163 (1989); Marie M. Fortune, et al., Introduction, 4 J. 
OF RELIGION & ABUSE 1 (2002); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions:  Of 
Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 79 (2009); Ruth Jones, The Extrajudicial 
Resolution of Sexual Abuse Cases:  Can the Church be a Resource for Survivors? 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 351 (2005); Kimmerly Anne Klee, Note, Clergy Malpractice:  Bad News for the Good 
Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985); Greg Slater, Note, Nally v. 
Grace Community Church of the Valley:  Absolution for Clergy Malpractice?, 1989 B.Y.U.  L. REV. 
913 (1989); Zshonette Reed, Note & Comment, Clergy Malpractice:  Defining the Duty and 
Dismissing the Claim, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. &  PRAC. 122 (2002); Janna Statz Nugent, Note, A 
Higher Authority:  The Viability of Third Party Tort Actions Against a Religious Institution 
Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the Clergy, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 970 (2003); 
Stephanie D. Young, Note, Sexual Molestation Within America’s Parishes and Congregations:  
Should the Church be ‘ Thy Priest’s Keeper’?, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (1989); and Constitutional 
Law-Free Exercise Clause-Texas Supreme Court Holds That Trial Court Lacks Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction Over Professional Negligence Claim Against Professional Counselor/Church Pastor, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 676 (2007).   
  The following books address the topic of clergy malpractice and/or clergy-related matters:  
DAVID D. BALKUM, SHEEP AMONG WOLVES:  TEXAS CHURCHES AND THE LAW (Pleasant Word 
2003); NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, BEFORE DALLAS (Paulist Press 2008); C. R. CAMBRIDGE, FORGIVE 
US OUR TRESPASSES (Hollis Books 1999);  DOBBS, supra note 24 at 681-88; PATRICK FLEMING ET 
AL. , BROKEN TRUST (Crossroad Pub. Co. 2007); RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT? 
(2d ed. Westminster John Knox Press 2005); K. A. FLYNN, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN BY 
MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY (McFarland & Co. 2003); MARIE M. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED?  
WHEN SEX INVADES THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHIP (Harper & Row 1989); GIBBS LAW FIRM, P. A., 
INFORMING THE FAITHFUL (Christian Law Association 2006); S. J. GRENZ & R. D. BELL, BETRAYAL 
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Pastoral counseling has been defined by one writer as “the use by clergy 
of counseling and psychotherapeutic methods to enable individuals, 
couples, and families to handle constructively their personal crises and 
problems in living.  Pastoral counseling draws on insights from 
contemporary understanding of human personality, therapeutic methods 
from current counseling approaches, and scriptural and theological 
resources.”35    
A survey of cases has revealed that courts rarely provide a complete 
definition of clergy malpractice.  One writer has created a description 
from a few cases and other sources.  He has stated that the courts appear 
to be thinking that clergy malpractice is:  
(1) negligent conduct that does not qualify as an intentional tort (2) in 
carrying out a religious act or duty (3) by one in a religious calling (4) 
directed toward a ‘client’ who has voluntarily accepted the authority or 
services of the religious actor as being religious in character and (5) of 
such a nature that legal adjudication would require consideration of 
religious doctrine or at least religious practices or would otherwise 
burden the free exercise of religion.36 
A cause of action for clergy malpractice, as with other professional 
negligence cases, requires the claimant to establish a duty of care based 
on the professional standard of care, a breach of that duty, cause in fact, 
proximate or legal cause, and damage.37  More specifically, the elements 
 
OF TRUST:  CONFRONTING AND PREVENTING CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. Baker Books 
2001); E. A. HORST, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (The 
Liturgical Press 2000); MARGARET C. JASPER, RELIGION AND THE LAW (Oceana Publications 
1998); K. A. MCCLINTOCK, PREVENTING SEXUAL ABUSE IN CONGREGATIONS:  A RESOURCE FOR 
LEADERS (The Alban Institute 2004); THOMAS G. PLANTE, SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS (Praeger 
Publishers 2004); W. A. Stacey et al., How Much Clergy Malfeasance is Really Out There?  A 
Victimization Survey of Prevalence and Perceptions, in A. SHUPE, ET AL., BAD PASTORS:  CLERGY 
MISCONDUCT IN MODERN AMERICA 187-213 (New York University Press 2000); THOMAS F. 
TAYLOR,  SEVEN DEADLY LAWSUITS:  HOW MINISTERS CAN AVOID LITIGATION AND REGULATION 
(Abingdon Press 1996). 
 35. Patrick I. Shea, Constitutional Issues Involved in Regulation of Spiritual Counseling and 
the Duty to Train, in TORT AND RELIGION 1 (ABA 1990).  See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community 
Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987).  
 36. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683.  See also id. nn.24-27 (citing Bear Valley Church of Christ 
v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (pertaining to whether the defendant’s 
conduct was religious); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991) (concerning elements (1), 
(2) and (3) in the accompanying text to this footnote indicating that “clergy malpractice” does not 
include torts like battery, only the omission to exercise that level of care and skill ordinarily 
exercised by clergypersons in performing their professional responsibilities); F. G. v. MacDonell, 
696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (addressing the concern of courts if faced with malpractice or sexual 
misconduct cases that involve free exercise of religion doctrines or practices)). 
 37. See Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747, 764 (Miss. 2004) (en banc). 
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of proof require the breach of a duty of professional care by the 
clergyperson in providing pastoral counseling or other religious services, 
which is factually and legally the cause of the parishioner’s or claimant’s 
injury.38 
B.   Judicial Analyses of Clergy Malpractice Claims 
In recent years, courts throughout the country have frequently been 
faced with claims against clergypersons and churches alleging clergy 
malpractice39.  Usually, these professional negligence claims have been 
rejected by courts based on one or both First Amendment religion 
clauses40 and/or because of the reluctance of courts generally to apply to 
clerics the same level of care imposed upon mental health and other 
medical professionals.41 
 
 38. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 110.  See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1987).  The Hester court, in referring to malpractice involving the clergy, stated the following: 
It is a theory of tort . . . which presupposes that every cleric owes, the same duty of care, 
whatever the religious order which granted ordination, or the cleric serves, or the beliefs 
espoused.   It is a theory of tort, moreover, which inevitably involves the court in a 
judgment of the competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function in 
order to determine whether the cleric breached the duty “to act with that degree of skill 
and learning ordinarily used in the same or similar circumstances by members of that 
profession.” 
Id. at 553. 
 39. See supra note 8. 
 40. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are the two religion provisions in the First 
Amendment.  The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See, 
e.g., Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007) (discussing the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394-96 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (emphasizing the Establishment Clause).  
For a discussion of the two First Amendment religion clauses, see infra Section IV and 
accompanying notes. 
 41. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 959-61 (Cal. 1988); 
White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).  The facts in the White case are 
similar to those in Nally.  In White, the Utah Court of Appeals considered and dismissed the 
claimants’ clergy malpractice action.  The parents alleged negligent failure by clergy to refer their 
son “to trained professionals.”  The White court stated: 
[A]ppellant wishes to impose a duty upon [clergy] to make further inquiry into the 
alleged family conflicts, and then, if beyond [their] expertise, refer [parishioners] to 
others who are qualified to treat such problems.  Under the present circumstances, 
charging lay clergy with this duty of care goes too far because it approaches . . . the same 
level of care imposed upon trained professionals in medicine and psychology. 
. . . .  
“Even assuming that workable standards of care could be established in the present case 
. . . [s]uch a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the 
particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.” 
Id. (quoting Nally, 763 P.2d at 960). 
11
Fain: Minimizing Liability for Church-Related Counseling Services
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
11_FAIN_WESTERN.DOCM 2/11/2011  9:56 AM 
232 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:221 
The case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley42 was 
filed on March 31, 198043 and has precipitated a number of clergy 
malpractice lawsuits across the United States. The most recent Nally 
opinion was issued by the Supreme Court of California in 1988 in which 
the court declined to impose on nontherapist pastoral counselors the duty 
to prevent suicide or to refer a potentially suicidal person to a licensed 
mental health professional once suicide becomes a foreseeable risk.44  A 
wrongful death action was filed by the decedent’s parents against a 
Protestant church and four of its pastors, asserting clergy malpractice.45  
Defendants were accused of negligence and outrageous conduct for 
failure to prevent the decedent’s suicide.46  The deceased had a history of 
emotional problems, which he experienced between 1974 and 1979.47  
During that period, he was active in a myriad of activities and ministries 
sponsored by his church.48  Furthermore, during the period that the 
decedent was associated with the church, he experienced personal and 
family difficulties that necessitated pastoral counseling, secular therapy, 
and physical examinations by medical doctors.49  Prior to the decedent 
committing suicide by shooting himself in the head with a shotgun, he 
had participated in at least five pastoral counseling sessions and had 
attempted to commit suicide by consuming an overdose of an 
antidepressant drug prescribed by a medical doctor.50  Although the 
decedent indicated his desire to take his own life on more than one 
occasion, the church clerics who were involved in pastoral or spiritual 
counseling did not refer decedent to a psychiatrist initially.51  One of the 
clerics named in the suit did, however, remind the decedent of the 
decedent’s appointments with the decedent’s psychiatrist, who treated 
the decedent after he attempted suicide and was hospitalized.52 
In addressing the issue of whether the defendants, nontherapist 
counselors, have a legal duty to refer potentially suicidal persons to 
 
 42. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). 
 43. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 309-10 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (California Court of Appeals dissent).  This California Court of Appeals opinion also 
contains information concerning the plaintiffs’ complaint (asserting clergyman malpractice for 
negligent counseling).  
 44. Nally, 763 P.2d at 960-61.  
 45. Id at 949. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 950-52. 
 48. Id. at 950. 
 49. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950-51. 
 50. Id. at 949-51. 
 51. Id. at 951-52. 
 52. Id at 951. 
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licensed mental health professionals once self-destruction becomes 
reasonably foreseeable, the court in Nally considered the existence of a 
special relationship between the deceased and the defendants, and failed 
to find one.53  The court cited two California cases, Meier v. Ross 
General Hospital54 and Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital,55 where a duty 
to prevent foreseeable suicide was imposed on hospitals, which accepted 
the responsibility of caring for patients who were suicidal, conditioned 
on the existence of a special relationship between each hospital and its 
patient.56  Contrary to Meier and Vistica, the decedent in Nally did not 
have a supervised medical relationship with the pastoral counselors at 
his church.57  Furthermore, neither Meier nor Vistica proposed the 
extension of a “duty of care to personal or religious counseling 
relationships in which one person provided nonprofessional guidance to 
another seeking advice and [where] the counselor had no control over 
the environment of the individual being counseled.”58 
The court considered whether there was a sufficient causal 
connection between the nontherapist pastoral counselor’s conduct (his 
failure to refer) and the decedent’s suicide.59  This causal link was found 
to be weak because the pastoral counselors arranged appointments, 
promoted visits and urged cooperation with the five physicians and one 
psychiatrist who examined the decedent during the period subsequent to 
his attempts to commit suicide.60  The court noted that “[m]ere 
foreseeability of the harm or knowledge of the danger is insufficient to 
create a legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal duty 
to prevent harm.”61  The Nally court also commented on the fact that 
members of the clergy are not required by legislation to obtain licenses 
like “marriage, family, child and domestic counselors.”62   In brief, the 
court noted that “the Legislature has recognized that access to the clergy 
for counseling should be free from state imposed counseling standards, 
and that ‘the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of 
 
 53. Id. at 956-58. 
 54. 445 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1968). 
 55. 432 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1967). 
 56. Nally, 763 P.2d at 956. 
 57. Id. at 957. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 958, 959 n.7. 
 60. Id. at 959. 
 61. Nally, 763 P.2d at 959. 
 62. Id. 
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counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious 
organizations.’ ”63 
A federal court decision involving a counseling relationship 
between a parishioner and a pastor originated in Illinois, a state that has 
rejected clergy malpractice claims.64  Affirming in part the judgment of 
the United States District Court, the United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit, explained why it approved of the District Court’s 
rationale concerning the plaintiff parishioner’s professional negligence 
action in the 1994 case of Dausch v. Rykse.65  The Court of Appeals 
agreed with the District Court that the professional negligence action 
was actually one for clergy malpractice, which was a claim that had been 
soundly repudiated by Illinois courts, a position similar to that taken by 
some other courts in this country.66 
According to the parishioner plaintiff’s complaint in the Dausch 
case, the pastor defendant held himself out, and the church defendants 
represented as well, that the pastor was “a duly qualified person engaged 
in providing psychological counseling”67 to congregants.  In order for 
the parishioner plaintiff to cope with depression and other emotional 
problems she was having, during a period of about two years and five 
months beginning in January of 1988, the plaintiff sought psychological 
counseling from the pastor.68   The plaintiff alleged that during this 
professional counseling relationship, the pastor “‘compelled, 
encouraged, fostered, and engaged in dangerous and improper 
counseling relations with plaintiff,’”69 which “included sexual contact 
during the course of the psychotherapy.”70   Furthermore, the parishioner 
 
 63. Id. at 959-60. 
 64. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 65. Id. at 1428.  
 66. Id. at 1428, 1432 & n.4 (citing Handley v. Richards, 518 So.2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Moses v. 
Diocese, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); 
Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Doe 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. 1993) (clergy malpractice action defeated on 
other grounds); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993) (clergy malpractice 
action defeated on other grounds); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); 
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Fontaine v. Roman 
Catholic Church, 625 So.2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 
(Sup. Ct. 1992); E. J. M. v. Archdiocese, 622 A.2d 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).  As stated in 
Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
the courts in the preceding cases have declined to acknowledge clergy malpractice actions except 
for the Doe and Bladen courts that defeated the action on other grounds. 
 67. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1428. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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plaintiff alleged that “the church defendants knew or should have known 
of these improper counseling relations.”71  In the plaintiff’s 
memorandum in response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss the 
complaint, the plaintiff stated that she was told by the pastor defendant 
that her condition required secular psychological counseling, not 
religious counseling, because religion did not apply to her case.72  The 
plaintiff alleged that she became very attached to the pastor and pre-
occupied with the therapy, which the plaintiff believed was being 
provided by a “capable trained professional” upon whom she could 
depend for help in managing her personal difficulties.73  Approximately 
six months after the inception of the counseling relationship, in June of 
1988, the pastor allegedly gave the parishioner plaintiff the ultimatum in 
which the pastor stated:  “I have been giving to you, and I need 
something back for my services.  You must give back to me or I will not 
work with you anymore.”74   Allegedly, this is the point at which the 
therapy sessions began to involve sexual relations between the plaintiff 
and the pastor defendant lasting until May of 1990.75   
The Dausch court indicated that those courts that have considered, 
but disallowed clergy malpractice claims, have acknowledged the free 
exercise of religion implications of that acknowledgement.76  Free 
exercise of religion considerations in this regard, however, would be 
impertinent if the pastor defendant’s behavior towards the parishioner 
plaintiff was not a part of the church’s beliefs and practices.77  The 
United States Court of Appeals reiterated the United States District 
Court’s conclusion that the parishioner failed to sufficiently assert that 
the psychological counseling provided by the pastor defendant was 
separate from the religious beliefs and practices of the church.78  
Therefore, First Amendment Free Exercise Clause considerations 
prevented the parishioner from having a valid action against the church 
defendants.79   
Even if the court in Dausch decided to recognize a claim for clergy 
malpractice, the church defendants could not be found vicariously liable 
for the wrongful conduct of the pastor just because he was an employee 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Dausch, 52 F. 3d at 1428 n.3. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1428. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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of the church defendants.80  The pastor’s actions toward the parishioner 
were “solely for [the pastor’s] . . . own benefit and not . . . part of his 
ministerial duties.”81  No allegation was made by the parishioner “that 
the church defendants knew or should have known” about the pastor’s 
sexual misconduct or that there was a need to exert control over him.82  
Consequently, due to this lack of awareness of the pastor’s inappropriate 
relations with the parishioner plaintiff or the need to control the pastor’s 
behavior, the church defendants could not be held liable for “failing to 
exercise reasonable care over . . .  [the pastor] when acting outside of the 
scope of his employment.”83  As to the church defendants, the United 
States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the 
parishioner plaintiff’s professional negligence claim (which the court 
characterized more accurately as clergy malpractice).84  The United 
States District Court’s dismissal of that same claim against the pastor 
defendant, however, was reversed by the United States Court of 
Appeals, and the case was remanded.85 
The Supreme Court of Utah considered a clerical malpractice action 
and other claims in Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints,86 involving harm allegedly sustained by plaintiffs (a former 
church member and her parents) caused by advice they received during 
religious counseling sessions provided by the Latter-day Saints (LDS) 
Church defendants.87 According to the complaint, the plaintiffs (Lynette 
Earl Franco and her parents) requested religious counseling from the 
bishop of their LDS Church ward88 and from the Church stake89 
president after plaintiff Franco, then fourteen, remembered being 
sexually abused when she was seven years of age.90  The offender was 
fourteen at the time he committed the wrongdoing, and the abuse was 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1425, 1428. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1429. 
 85. Id.  
 86. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001).  In addition to clerical malpractice, the plaintiffs in Franco 
asserted gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.  Id. at 201.   
 87. Id. at 200. 
 88. A “ward” has been defined as “an ecclesiastical division of the LDS Church, based upon 
geographical area.”  Id. at 200 n.1. 
 89. A “stake” has been defined as “an ecclesiastical division of the LDS Church that consists 
of several wards.”  Id. at 200 n.3.  One who serves as “stake president” in the LDS Church “is the 
ecclesiastical leader of a stake.”  Id. at 200 n.4.    
 90. Franco, 21 P.3d at 200. 
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allegedly so extreme that Franco repressed the memory of the 
incidents.91 Both Franco and her offender were members of the same 
church at the time the sexual abuse occurred.92 
The advice given to Franco during the counseling sessions was to 
“forgive, forget, and seek Atonement.”93  Franco requested that the two 
church defendants, who were counseling her, make a referral to a 
licensed mental health professional once Franco discovered the need for 
additional therapy.94  Although Franco and her parents were sent to a 
mental health center, the doctor defendant to whom they were referred 
was not a licensed mental health professional in the state of Utah.95  
Furthermore, the doctor’s advice to Franco was similar to that of the 
church defendants, which was for Franco “to forgive . . . and forget the 
incidents of sexual abuse rather than to inform the police.”96  Since this 
advice was unacceptable, Franco and her parents procured the services 
of a different secular counselor, who subsequently informed the police 
of the sexual abuse.97  This in turn led to Franco being “ostracized and 
denigrated” by the other church members, with the approval of the 
bishop and the president, who were the LDS Church officials that 
initially provided the religious counseling to Franco and her parents.98  
Due to the maltreatment she received from the other parishioners, 
Franco decided to leave the LDS Church.99   
The court in the Franco case discussed the adjudication of claims 
for clergy malpractice even though the plaintiffs decided to abandon 
their malpractice action on this appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.100  
The frequency and uniform rejection of clergy malpractice litigation 
based on the First Amendment in recent years were noted by the court in 
spite of the controversial nature of this type of action101 as illustrated in 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 201. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Franco, 21 P.3d at 201. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 205-06. 
 101. Id. at 204.  See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Coffey J. concurring); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 
N.E.2d 446, 453 (Ill. App. 1997); Scheiffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 
1993).  Generally, these courts have stated that clergy malpractice actions would “entangle the 
courts in the examination of religious doctrine, practice or church polity,” which is disallowed by 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001). 
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Dausch v. Rykse,102 Amato v. Greenquist,103 Schieffer v. Catholic 
Archdiocese,104 Byrd v. Faber,105 Schmidt v. Bishop,106 White v. 
Blackburn,107 and Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley.108 
In analyzing the plaintiffs’ three other negligence-based claims—
namely gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
breach of fiduciary duty109–the court in Franco indicated its agreement 
with the LDS Church defendants’ argument that these claims were 
simply “a roundabout way of alleging clergy malpractice.”110  More 
precisely, the court determined that the gist or substance of plaintiff 
Franco’s three negligence-based claims was that the LDS Church 
defendants provided bad advice, which amounted to a mishandling of 
the pastoral counseling relationship and duties.111  Consequently, the 
court had to address the real question in this case—clergy malpractice—
regardless of Franco and her parents naming the three negligence-based 
claims in their complaint as gross negligence, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.112  These misdeeds, 
allegedly committed by the LDS Church defendants, entailed breaching 
“a duty owed to Franco by advising her to ‘forgive, forget, and seek 
Atonement’ or by advising her to seek outside help from [defendant] 
Browning, an unlicensed therapist.”113   
The court stated how the Franco case is similar to the Nally114 and 
White115 cases, also involving the mishandling of religious counseling 
 
 102. 52 F. 3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Coffey, J. concurring). 
 103. 679 N.E.2d 446 ( Ill. App. 1997). 
 104. 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993). 
 105. 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991). 
 106. 779 F. Supp.321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 107. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
 108. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal.1988). 
 109. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 205-06 (Utah 
2001). 
 110. Id. at 205. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (citing Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F. 3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (“stating that [the] 
district court correctly determined that [the] plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty was 
‘simply an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice’ ”); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,  
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that “as with her negligence claim, [plaintiff’s] fiduciary duty claim is 
merely another way of alleging that the [clergyman] grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, that he 
engaged in malpractice”); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E. 2d 446, 451 (Ill. App. 1997) (“stating that 
‘we will not determine the justiciability of [plaintiff’s] counts based upon the nomenclature used by 
the plaintiff in entitling the counts’ in determining whether a negligence claim against a cleric is 
essentially a malpractice claim”). 
 113. Franco, 21 P.3d at 205. 
 114. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).  
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duties where the claimants asserted clergy malpractice.116  A resolution 
of that claim could not be made absent an initial determination of 
whether the LDS Church defendants carried out their counseling 
responsibilities in accordance with “the level of expertise expected of a 
similar professional, i.e., a reasonably prudent bishop, priest, rabbi, 
minister, or other cleric in . . . [the] state [of Utah].”117  In fact, the 
malpractice theory, in a case such as this involving a cleric who is a LDS 
Church bishop, required the application of the professional standard of 
care, which is used to determine whether the bishop “breached the duty 
to act with that degree of ‘skill and knowledge normally possessed by 
members of that profession.’”118  Interpreting a duty such as this would 
mandate that a court articulate the standard to be complied with by other 
reasonable clergypersons in the execution of their religious counseling 
obligations, which would involve the courts in formulating “the training, 
skill, and standards”119 applicable to clergypersons of various religious 
denominations throughout the state that declare “widely varying 
beliefs.”120  The Franco court decided that such a task or objective was 
impossible and unconstitutional; therefore, if the court were to establish 
the standard of care, et cetera, applicable to clergypersons performing 
religious counseling, it would encourage “an excessive government 
entanglement with religion,”121 thereby violating the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.122 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas dismissed several tort claims 
against a pastor, three church elders, and the Crossland Community 
Bible Church in the case of Westbrook v. Penley.123  The former church 
member plaintiff communicated confidential information to Westbrook, 
the pastor, who subsequently disclosed that information in a letter to the 
 
 115. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
 116. Franco, 21 P.3d at 204 (citing Nally, 763 P.2d 948; White, 787 P.2d 1315). 
 117. Franco, 21 P.3d at 205. 
 118. Id. at 205-06 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)). 
 119. Franco, 21 P. 3d. at 206. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing Dausch, 52 F. 3d at 1432 (declaring “that an evaluation of a clergy malpractice 
claim would require courts to evaluate and investigate religious tenets and doctrines”); Hester v. 
Barnett, 723 S.W, 2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“stating that clergy malpractice would force 
courts to judge ‘competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function’”); F.G. v. 
MacDonell, 696 A. 2d 697, 706 (N.J. 1997) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (expressing the view “that 
creating a tort of clergy malpractice would ‘establish an official religion of the state’”); Bladen v. 
First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P. 2d 789, 797 (Okla. 1993) (declaring that “[o]nce a 
court enters the realm of trying to define the nature of advice a minister should give a parishioner, 
serious First Amendment issues are implicated”). 
 123. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
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congregants and encouraged them to shun the plaintiff, Penley, for 
entering into a “biblically inappropriate relationship.”124  The church’s 
constitution allowed for the application of the disciplinary process to 
parishioners who engaged in serious misconduct such as that engaged in 
by the plaintiff.125  Westbrook, a pastor and a licensed professional 
marriage counselor, along with the other church-related defendants, were 
sued for professional negligence (malpractice), breach of fiduciary duty, 
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.126  Plaintiff 
sought counseling initially from the defendant Westbrook, who was a 
fellow parishioner at that time.127 The plaintiff paid for two or three of 
the sessions.128  Later, Westbrook and others formed a new church, and 
Westbrook was elected pastor.129  A constitution and statement of faith 
were created containing a disciplinary policy to which all membership 
applicants were required to indicate their willingness to comply.130  As 
with all applicants, the plaintiff agreed to abide by the church 
constitution131 that contained the following ecclesiastical disciplinary 
policy:132 
We believe that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to 
maintain the purity of the Body.  We are directed by God to be holy.  
In recognition of the importance of this obligation, the elders will 
biblically and lovingly utilize every appropriate means to restore 
members who find themselves in patterns of serious misconduct.  
When efforts at restoration fail, the elders will apply the Biblical 
teaching on church discipline, which could include revocation of 
membership, along with an appropriate announcement made to the 
membership (Matt 18:15-17; 1 Cor 5:1-5; Gal 6:1, 2; 2 Thes 3:6).133 
[Additionally], [t]he church’s constitution provided that, if a member 
engages in conduct that “violates Biblical standards, or which is 
detrimental to the ministry, unity, peace or purity of the church,” and 
the member is unrepentant, “the elders will follow our Lord’s 
instructions from Matthew 18:15-20.”134  If the member remains 
 
 124. Id. at 391. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 394. 
 127. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392-93, 402. 
 132. Id. at 392. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Matthew 18:15-17 of the Holy Bible states: 
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unrepentant and chooses not to resign, the constitution instructs the 
church authority to revoke the parishioner’s membership and announce 
the member’s removal to the congregation.  The church’s stated goal is 
“to encourage repentance and restoration of fellowship with the Lord 
and His people.”135 
The court in Westbrook recognized a strong constitutional 
presumption that supports protecting the interest of the church in 
handling its own affairs.136  Therefore, plaintiff-Penley’s secular interest 
in confidentiality was found to be less important than the church’s 
interest.137  Here, the First Amendment defense applied to the church’s 
interest, because this matter involved the defendant-pastor’s presumed 
duty to the plaintiff and the other congregants to adhere to the 
requirements of the church’s disciplinary policy and other provisions of 
the church constitution.138  It is clear that defendant-Westbrook’s 
position as pastor of the Cross Land Community Bible Church, as well 
as his pastor-parishioner relationship with plaintiff-Penley, imposed this 
obligation on Westbrook.139 
Generally, when confronted with conflicting secular and nonsecular 
interests like the ones at issue here, “courts have . . . held that ‘a spirit of 
freedom for religious organizations’ prevails . . . even if that freedom 
comes at the expense of other interests of high social importance”140 
which in this case was Penley’s interest in confidentiality.  As stated 
 
If your brother sins, go and show him his fault in private; if he listens to you, you have 
won your brother.  But if he does not listen to you, take one or two more with you, so 
that by the mouth of two or three witnesses every fact may be confirmed.  If he refuses 
to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let 
him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector. 
Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392 n.1 (quoting Matthew 18:15-17 (New American Standard Bible)). 
 135. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392.  
 136. Id. at 402. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 402.  See also, supra text accompanying notes 133-35. 
 139. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392. 
 140. Id. at 403 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)).  See also, Westbrook 231 S.W.3d at 403 (stating that the 
practice of shunning  
“‘[does] not . . . . constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of the 
community as to warrant state intervention,’ and  . . . . [that] ‘[i]ntangible or emotional 
harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a 
church for its practices-or against its members.’”) (quoting Paul v. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987); Dean v. Alford, 994 
S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring that “‘the preservation of the free 
exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities 
which may result from its liberal application’” (quoted in Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 
403)). 
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earlier, Penley’s interest in confidentiality concerned facts about her 
involvement in an extramarital sexual relationship and plans to divorce 
her husband, which she communicated privately to Westbrook, the 
pastor.141  In response to Penley’s disclosure, Westbrook counseled 
Penley and recommended a lawyer who specialized in family law.142  
Additionally, after Westbrook reminded Penley of the church 
disciplinary policy applicable to members who engage in extramarital 
affairs, Penley replied that she was relinquishing her church 
membership.143 
The Westbrook court dismissed the plaintiff’s case stating that her 
“pleading affirmatively negate[d] the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”144  It was apparent to the court that the former 
parishioner’s professional-negligence action against the pastor defendant 
“unconstitutionally impinge[d] upon internal matters of church 
governance in violation of the First Amendment.”145 
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES: DEFENSES TO CLERGY 
MALPRACTICE AND OTHER TORT CLAIMS AGAINST PASTORS AND 
CHURCHES 
Historically, courts declined to allow recovery in tort cases in 
which the matter to be resolved entailed a religious dispute as opposed to 
a secular conflict.146  According to the First Amendment to the United 
 
 141. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 393. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 405. 
 145. Id. 
 146. The following are examples of cases involving tort claims and other legal issues in which 
courts have discussed matters related to the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause.  Various courts 
have recognized the autonomy of churches to manage their own internal affairs, resolve their intra-
church disputes, decide those church matters that involve religious doctrine, and to be free of 
governmental encroachment on an individual’s belief or legitimate practice of a particular faith or 
denominational group.  See, e.g., Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. 
X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Marmelstein v. 
Kehillat New Hempstead:  The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 
2008); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007); Hancock v. True Living Church of Jesus 
Christ of Saints of Last Days, 118 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); Wende C. v. United Methodist 
Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 2004); Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App. 2000); Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d  54 (Tex. App. 2000); Klagsbrun 
v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp.2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999); Sanders v. Casa View 
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 
1997); Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. 
1997); L. L. N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1996); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Young v. N. Ill. Conference 
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States Constitution, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”147  
This Amendment containing, in part, two religion clauses applies to the 
federal government and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty component of the Due Process Clause.148  The 
essence of the two religion clauses of the First Amendment is the 
recognition of two areas of sovereignty when issues of government and 
religion are being adjudicated.149  The two religion clauses 
(establishment and free exercise provisions) “are designed to ‘prevent, as 
far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the 
precincts of the other,’”150 and are grounded on the concept “that ‘both 
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere.’”151 The judicial 
and legislative branches of the government are both restricted by the 
First Amendment.152  The following subsections illustrate generally how 
courts have responded to Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
arguments presented by clergypersons, churches and other religious 
organizations who have been sued for clergy malpractice and other 
tortious misconduct related or unrelated to counseling services.  
 
of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of America, 
856 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Shieffer v. Catholic 
Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468 
(8th Cir. 1993); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); 
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S. D. N. Y. 1991); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference 
of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D. C. Cir. 1990); Nayak v. MCA, Inc., 911 F.2d 1082 
(5th Cir. 1990); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Nally v. Grace 
Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 
(Colo. 1988) (en banc); Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N. Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 915 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 
U.S. 94 (1952); Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 
360 (Tex. 1909); Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. 253 
(1842).    
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 148. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 
202 (Utah 2001). 
 149. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395. 
 150. Id. at 395 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).  
 151. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985); 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). 
 152. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (citing Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 
191 (1960)). 
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A. Establishment Clause Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the Establishment 
Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman153 stating that this Clause requires “that 
there should be ‘no law respecting an establishment of religion,’”154 not 
simply prohibiting “the establishment of a state church or a state 
religion.”155  The term “state” in this context means all levels of 
government.156  Consequently, laws “that are ‘a step that could 
[ultimately] lead to . . . [an] establishment’”157 of a religion may 
constitute an infringement of the First Amendment even though they did 
not initially establish a religion.158  According to the three-part test in the 
Lemon case, in order for governmental activity or action not to qualify as 
a “law respecting an establishment of religion,” three requirements must 
be met.159  The governmental action (1) must have a “secular legislative 
purpose,” (2) must “neither advance . . . nor inhibit . . . religion,” and (3) 
“must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”160  Many courts have focused on the “excessive government 
entanglement” prong of the Lemon test in deciding matters involving the 
tort liability of clergypersons under the Establishment Clause.161  The 
 
 153. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The Lemon case involved a Rhode Island statute and a Pennsylvania 
statute providing state aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools.  The statutes were 
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court because they failed the excessive entanglement test 
since the laws promoted an excessive entanglement between religion and government.  Thus, the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was contravened.  Id. at 606-07, 613-14.  For two 
scholars’ analyses of the Lemon case, see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1330-31 (6th ed. 2000). 
 154. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).  See also Franco v. The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 203 (Utah 2001). 
 155. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203. 
 156. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 157. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203. 
 158. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203. 
 159. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.  See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203. 
 160. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).  
See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 198, 203; Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
 161. For examples of cases that have addressed or applied the “excessive entanglement” test 
(the third prong of the Lemon test) or the Establishment Clause in general to various tort actions 
against clergypersons and/or churches, see Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); 
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976); Nally v. Grace 
Community Church of the Valley, 763 P. 2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp 
321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 
913 S.W. 2d 92, 98-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Konkle v . Henson, 672 N.E. 2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1996); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W. 2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997): Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E. 2d 
395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877, 
897 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 
202-04, 206 (Utah 2001); A.B. v. Liberty United Methodist Church, 2002 WL 31890054 (Mo. Ct. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/6
11_FAIN_WESTERN.DOCM 2/11/2011  9:56 AM 
2011] MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR CHURCH-RELATED COUNSELING SERVICES 245 
excessive entanglement test examines the degree of the government’s 
contact with religion.  Due to the complex nature of present-day life, 
church and state contact is unavoidable to some extent.162 Thus, the 
concept of “separation of church and state” cannot be interpreted as “the 
absence of all governmental contact with religion.”163  
The Establishment Clause was asserted as a defense in Franco v. 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,164 in which a former 
church member and her parents asserted clerical malpractice, negligent 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud, and other claims against a church, some of the church officials, 
and others.165 Referring to the third prong of the Lemon test, “excessive 
government entanglement,” the court in Franco realized a well settled 
rule “that civil tort claims against clerics that require the courts to review 
and interpret church law, policies, or practices in the determination of 
the claims are barred by the First Amendment under the entanglement 
doctrine.”166  The court also recognized the authority of churches to 
decide certain issues related to church governance, religious doctrine, 
and faith without state interference.167 Conversely, if a tort action 
 
App. W.D. 2002); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Conn. 
2003); Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Olson v. 
First Church of Nazarene, 661 N. W. 2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); J. M. v. Minnesota Dist. 
Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W. 2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Mars v. Diocese of 
Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884 
So. 2d 747 (Miss. 2004); Wende C. V. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (App. Div. 
2004); Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005); Doe v. 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 855 N.E. 2d 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d by 880 N.E.2d 892; 
Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007); Young v. Gelineau, No. PC/03-1302, 2007 
R. I. Super. LEXIS 130, at *14-15 (Sept. 20, 2007); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394-95 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Lowery v. Cook, 
No. 20061086-CA, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 93, at *3 (March 15, 2007); Noll v. The Hartford 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2661 
(Oct. 20, 2008); Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead:  The Rav Aron Jofen Community 
Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375, 378 (N.Y. 2008); Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan 
Corp., No. X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); 
Mallory v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL 
765485, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009). 
 162. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 201.  See also supra text accompanying notes 86-100. 
 165. Id. at 200-01. 
 166. Id. at 203.  See also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 
(1976); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); L. L. N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 
440 (Wis. 1997); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 395 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
 167. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203-04.  See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952). 
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brought against a clergyperson is not germane to his theological efforts, 
the entanglement doctrine does not prevent such a claim because it is not 
within the scope of the First Amendment.168 
The courts in Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,169 White v. Blackburn,170 and Nally v. 
Grace Community Church of the Valley,171 articulated a principle similar 
to that in the Franco and Dausch v. Rykse cases.  That principle provides 
that the establishment of a claim for clerical malpractice “would create a 
duty of care for clergy and ‘would necessarily . . . intertwine [that duty] 
with the religious philosophy of [a] particular denomination or 
ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity’ with the courts.”172   
A violation of the First Amendment was found in the case of 
Hancock v. True & Living Church of Christ of Saints of the Last Days.173  
This case involved an alleged misrepresentation made by a church to the 
claimant that she would receive non-spiritual, as well as spiritual 
assistance, in exchange for a contribution.174  Specifically, the church 
promised the claimant property, support, and specified religious benefits 
if she would make a monetary donation to the church.175  The church’s 
promise to provide the claimant with property and support pertained to 
earthly benefits that amounted to secular activity, which the court found 
to be a violation of civil law.176  However, the promise of a “face-to-face 
meeting with Jesus Christ” was found to be entirely spiritual in nature.177  
Due to the religious character of the matter, the Hancock court 
determined that this issue was “beyond . . . [its] ability to adjudicate,”178 
thereby violating First Amendment principles.179  These principles 
appear to be consistent with those in the Gulbraa, White, Nally, Franco, 
and Dausch cases above. 
 
 168. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203 (citing Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So.2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (involving a slip and fall negligence action against a church); Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
370 So.2d 511 (La. 1979) (involving a negligence action against a church pastor for harm sustained 
by a parishioner “running in the spirit” at a time when the pastor failed to clear the aisles to allow 
for such religious expression)). 
 169. 159 P.3d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
 170. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
 171. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). 
 172. Gulbraa, 159 P.3d at 395; White, 787 P.2d at 1319; Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.  
 173. 118 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
 174. Id. at 298-99. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 300. 
 177. Id. at 300, n.2. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/6
11_FAIN_WESTERN.DOCM 2/11/2011  9:56 AM 
2011] MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR CHURCH-RELATED COUNSELING SERVICES 247 
As illustrated in the preceding cases, courts have generally held that 
adjudicating religious controversies would create a conflict with the First 
Amendment.  This holding has been interpreted as forbidding the 
government from excessive entanglement with church by-laws, church 
policies, church procedures, and church practices.180  Since the major 
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion, it has been said to be the basis 
of the doctrine of judicial abstention.181  Consequently, when the concept 
of judicial abstention or ecclesiastical abstention is addressed, the 
emphasis is on the competence of a civil court to review or determine 
religious controversies involving “church discipline, ecclesiastical 
government,”182 or parishioners’ conformity to a required standard of 
moral conduct.183 In other words, civil court review of church-related 
issues would mandate a judicial investigation into “the doctrines and 
order of an ecclesiastical legal order.”184 
B. Free Exercise Clause Analysis 
Similar to the Establishment Clause cases, a number of courts have 
considered actions involving the Free Exercise Clause in which 
parishioners and others have sued church leaders, churches, and other 
religious organizations.185  Courts have noted that the Free Exercise 
Clause insures “the protection of two concepts, ‘freedom to believe and 
freedom to act.’”186  “Freedom to believe” is said to be absolute while 
 
 180. House of God Which Is The Church Of The Living God, The Pillar And Ground Of The 
Truth Without Controversy, Inc. v. White, 792 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997)).  
 181. Paul J. Morken, Church Discipline and Civil Tort Claims:  Should Ecclesiastical 
Tribunals Be Immune?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 93, 116-17 (1991/1992).  
 182.  Id. at 135.  See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395-400 (Tex. 2007). 
 183. Morken, supra note 181, at 135.  See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 395-400. 
 184. Morken, supra note 181, at 135.  See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 395-400. 
 185. See, e.g., Cerninka v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. 
X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Mallory v. The 
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL 765485 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 409-10 (Mass. 2009); Noll v. The 
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2661, at *5-6 (Oct. 20, 2008); Young  v. Gelineau, No. PC/03-1302, 2007 R.I. Super. 
LEXIS 130, at *10, 14, 16, 17 (Sept. 20, 2007); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007); 
Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1994); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal 
Church, 884 So.2d 747, 754-55 (Miss. 2004) (en banc); Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 
130 Cal. Rptr.2d 601, 616 (Ct. App. 2003), as modified Mar. 17, 2003; Sanders v. Casa View 
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 186. McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823, 830 (2d Dist. 1987).   
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“freedom to act” or “religious conduct” is said to be subject to regulation 
in order to safeguard the public.187   
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court in the case of Westbrook v. 
Penley,188 described two distinct ways that laws or governmental 
conduct may burden the free exercise of religion.  One way is by 
hindering a person’s liberty to observe or practice a specific faith.189  
The second way governmental action imposes a burden on religious 
freedom is by intruding on a church’s ability to manage or govern its 
own internal matters.190 The plaintiff in Westbrook was a former 
parishioner who participated in marital counseling sessions with the 
pastor (a licensed counselor) until she was shunned by the other church 
members at the urging of the pastor-defendant.191  The reason for the 
pastor’s conduct toward the plaintiff was her decision to divorce her 
husband and a “biblically inappropriate” sexual relationship she was 
having with another man.192  Plaintiff’s confidential disclosure to the 
pastor concerning her extramarital affair and divorce decision caused the 
pastor and church elders to write a letter to the congregation regarding 
the plaintiff’s actions.193 Plaintiff’s claims against the church, the pastor, 
and church elders for professional negligence, defamation, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and the commission of other torts were dismissed by the 
court.194 Finally, the Westbrook court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
“professional-negligence claim against . . . [the pastor] 
unconstitutionally impinge[d] upon internal matters of church 
governance in violation of the First Amendment.”195 
A federal appeals court in Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church,196 
refused to find that the Free Exercise Clause barred claims against a 
minister-defendant who was sued for counseling malpractice and breach 
of fiduciary duty by two parishioners, who were also employees of the 
 
 187. Id.  See also Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-38 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Noll v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 2661, at *5-29 (Oct. 20, 2008). 
 188. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
 189. Id. at 395 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 532 (1993)). 
 190. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 191. Westbrook, 231 SW3d at 392-93. 
 192. Id. at 393. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 394, 405. 
 195. Id. at 405. 
 196. 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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church-defendant.197  The court affirmed the award of a summary 
judgment by the lower court to the church, thereby declining to impose 
liability on the church-defendant for negligence and Title VII violations 
(discrimination and termination based on gender).198  Furthermore, there 
was no vicarious liability imposed on the church under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior for the minister’s sexual relationship with the two 
parishioners that occurred during the period they were receiving marital 
counseling in which they revealed intimate details about their sexual 
backgrounds and marriages to the minister.199  The minister maintained 
that the two parishioners’ claims were not actionable because the clergy 
misconduct occurred within “inherently ecclesiastical” counseling 
relationships instead of “purely secular” counseling situations.200  The 
minister’s position, therefore, was that certain religious controversies are 
prohibited from being judicially reviewed based on the First 
Amendment.201  More specifically, the minister’s assertions that he was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law focused on the following:  
occasional or intermittent discussions of scripture in the marital 
counseling sessions verifying that the minister’s advice and assistance 
were not purely secular or that the evidence established that the two 
parishioners’ allegations were actually noncognizable actions for “clergy 
malpractice.”202  
The court in Sanders disagreed with the minister’s argument that he 
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law stating that “[t]he First 
Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships from 
judicial scrutiny, for to do so would necessarily extend constitutional 
protection to the secular components of these relationships.”203 Further, 
the court noted that if it were to accept the minister’s position that the 
Free Exercise Clause prevents judicial review of relationships that do not 
qualify as “purely secular,” this could result in the abolition of civil or 
criminal responsibility for members of the clergy involved in critical 
religious relationships.204  Even if an ecclesiastical relationship between 
a minister and a congregant only partially includes “secular beliefs and 
behavior,” the Sanders court maintained that religious freedom 
guaranteed under the Constitution cannot be interpreted by the courts as 
 
 197. Id. at 333-34, 337-38. 
 198. Id. at 338-40. 
 199. Id. at 333-34, 339. 
 200. Id. at 335. 
 201. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 335.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 335-36 (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. at 336. 
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safeguarding those “secular beliefs and behavior.”205  Therefore, 
according to Sanders, if courts do construe and hold that freedom of 
religion protects secular beliefs and behavior, religious officials would 
be “impermissibly place[d] . . . in a preferred position in our society.”206 
Courts have repeatedly expressed how the Free Exercise Clause has 
protected clergyperson-parishioner religious relationships and 
counseling relationships mainly by preventing courts from deciding 
theological disputes that focus on issues concerning “religious doctrine 
or practice.” This was articulated in Sanders v. Casa View Baptist 
Church,207 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church,208 and Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. 
Employment Security Div.209  The sacredness of the religious 
relationship and the counseling relationship is safeguarded further by 
other religious freedoms according to the courts in Employment Div. v. 
Smith210 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.211 Clergy malpractice actions have 
been “rejected uniformly” by state courts because the judiciary must 
refrain or abstain from deciding ecclesiastical conflicts concerning 
matters of doctrine or practice212 because clergy malpractice requires 
that the pertinent standard of care be defined.213  If the courts define that 
standard, they could become involved in “establishing the training, skill, 
and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of 
religions with widely varying beliefs.”214  Additionally, describing that 
standard would obligate “courts to identify the beliefs and practices of 
the relevant religion and then . . . determine whether the clergyman had 
acted in accordance”215 with those beliefs and practices.  In other words, 
according to the Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church case, in order for 
a clergy malpractice action to be recognized, courts would be compelled 
 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 336 (citing Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) 
(interpreting the first Amendment to preclude the state from favoring religion over nonreligion)). 
 207. For a discussion of the Free Exercise Clause’s protection of clergyperson-parishioner 
religious and counseling relationships, see Sanders, 134 F.3d at 336. 
 208. 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969). 
 209. 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ((setting out the rule that “[c]ourts are not arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation”) (emphasis added)). 
 210. 494 U.S. 872, 877-78, 881 (1990). 
 211. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 212. Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Dausch v. 
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994)(Ripple, J., concurring); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 
275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); F. G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997)). 
 213. See F.G., 696 A.2d at 703; Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337. 
 214. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337.  See also F.G., 696 A.2d at 703. 
 215. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337.  See also F.G., 696 A.2d at 703. 
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to “identify and apply the teachings of a particular faith.”216  This 
imposes a duty on the courts to decide which conduct and beliefs are 
components of a particular faith or religion.217 
The Sanders court noted that when the duties upon which a 
claimant’s clergy malpractice action against a minister, who provides 
marriage counseling and breaches fiduciary duties do not stem from 
religious tenets, the First Amendment will not protect the minister from 
liability.218  Since the jury in the United States District Court determined 
that the minister held himself out to the claimants as having “the 
education and experience of a professional marriage counselor,”219 the 
minister’s “counseling activities with the . . . [claimants] were judged, 
not by a standard of care defined by religious teachings, but by a 
professional standard of care developed through expert testimony 
describing what a reasonably prudent counselor would have done under 
the same or similar circumstances.”220  The United States Court of 
Appeals agreed with the District Court and concluded that the two 
claimants were entitled to a favorable judgment on the basis that their 
claims were not barred by a constitutional principle derived from the 
First Amendment that provides for judicial abstention.221  In other 
words, the principle “that the judiciary must abstain from ecclesiastical 
disputes concerning questions of religious doctrine and practice”222 did 
not insulate the minister in Sanders from liability since his conduct 
toward the claimants was not based on the theological beliefs and 
practices of his church.223  Therefore, the minister-defendant did not 
receive a judgment as a matter of law.224 
V.  CONCLUSION:  MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR CHURCH-RELATED 
COUNSELING SERVICES 
Minimizing liability for church-related counseling services is 
imperative in view of the frequency and increased number of lawsuits 
being brought against churches, pastors, and other church officials in 
recent years.  Various legal practitioners and scholars have 
 
 216. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 338. 
 224. Id. 
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recommended that churches and other religious organizations do the 
following to minimize their liability:  take reasonable care in hiring 
pastors; adopt and follow a pastoral counseling policy emphasizing 
biblical advice as opposed to mental health or family therapy; employ 
counseling agreements; refer parishioners to psychiatric or other 
professional counselors if necessary; avoid counseling persons under 
particular situations, especially members of the opposite sex; keep 
records of the counseling sessions; comply with state licensing laws 
applicable to professional counselors; and procure professional liability 
insurance that covers negligent acts, and other omissions and errors 
committed by pastors and others with counseling responsibilities.225  The 
sections below address each of the preceding items. 
A. Utilizing Reasonable Care In Hiring A Pastor Or Counselor226 
● Prior to appointing a pastor or engaging the services of a counselor, 
a church must investigate the person’s background to determine his 
or her experience, credentials, character, and overall fitness. 
● Work history information may be obtained by contacting secular 
employers, churches or other organizations for whom the candidate 
has worked or served in the past years.  
● A criminal background check should be conducted in the states in 
which the candidate has been employed.  If practical, investigate 
the states where the candidate has resided even if the candidate was 
not employed or did not serve in a church in those states.  
● Request that the candidate give the church permission to do a 
criminal record investigation by signing a consent form designed 
for that purpose.  
● The church’s employment process should also comprise the usual 
tools like “applications, detailed interviews, reference and 
education verifications, and follow-up evaluations.”227 
 
 225. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74-82; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 87, 94-96, 99-105, 
115-18. 
 226. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74.  See also Christian Life Commission, Broken 
Trust:  Confronting Clergy Sexual Misconduct 32 (n.d.). 
 227. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74-75. 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/6
11_FAIN_WESTERN.DOCM 2/11/2011  9:56 AM 
2011] MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR CHURCH-RELATED COUNSELING SERVICES 253 
B.   Adopting A Pastoral Counseling Policy Emphasizing Biblical 
Advice 
● Create and approve a pastoral counseling policy, and request that 
the pastoral counselor or church official who is providing such 
services sign an agreement to comply with the policy.228 
● The pastoral counselor or church official, who is providing spiritual 
guidance to parishioners, should emphasize and restrict his or her 
assistance to biblical counseling unless he or she has received 
training from an accredited institution and is licensed by the state as 
a professional counselor.  A pastoral counselor or church official 
who does not have such credentials should avoid giving “medical, 
mental health, . . . family therapy,” marriage counseling or other 
nonbiblical counseling and refer parishioners to the appropriate 
professionals.229 
● Since the pastoral counselor should emphasize biblical or spiritual 
counseling during his or her meetings with counselees, suggested 
methods of maintaining a spiritual focus include:  (a) praying at the 
beginning of the session; (b) keeping a Bible present, open, and 
clearly visible during the session; (c) reading one or more Scripture 
references during the session; (d) assigning scriptural homework to 
the counselee; and (e) praying at the end of the session.230 
● The counseling policy should require the counselor to be cautious 
about those to whom he or she provides counsel.  Selectiveness as 
to those individuals one chooses to counsel is crucial.  It is much 
more difficult to terminate a counseling relationship than it is to 
start one.231 
C.   Employing A Counseling Agreement232 
● Adults who are being counseled should be required to sign a 
Counseling Agreement on behalf of himself or herself or on behalf 
of his or her minor child depending on who is the counselee. 
● The person who signs the Counseling Agreement acknowledges 
and accepts that the type of counseling he or she receives is 
Biblical, not professional. 
 
 228. Id. at 75.  See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 100. 
 229. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 75.  See also Constance F. Fain, Clergy Malpractice:  
Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 97, 123-24 (1991). 
 230. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 75-76. 
 231. Id. at 75. 
 232. Id. at 76. 
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● The person who signs the agreement is indicating his or her 
acknowledgment that the pastor or other person that provides the 
counseling services is not a state licensed “counselor, social 
worker, or therapist.”233 That signature also expresses recognition 
that the counselor has not been trained as a “professional in 
psychological counseling, psychiatric therapy, or marriage and 
family counseling or therapy . . . .”234 
● By signing the agreement, the counselee indicates his or her 
willingness not to file a claim against the church for any costs or 
damages caused by the counseling services of the pastor, other 
church official or pastoral counselor. 
● Signing the agreement represents the counselee’s consent for 
certain confidential communications to be reported to the proper 
state law enforcement authorities because the law mandates 
disclosure.235  Examples of matters that may fall into this category 
are child abuse, threats to seriously harm or kill another, or other 
menacing remarks of violence that could lead to personal or 
property damage.236 
D.   Referring Parishioners To Psychiatric Or Other Professional 
Counselors 
● Parishioners who are experiencing severe problems that necessitate 
the services of a professional counselor should be referred to a 
psychiatric counselor or medical professional.237 
● A Baptist minister who has served as a pastoral counselor at a 
counseling and education center has recommended that a 
clergyperson make referrals to the appropriate professionals or 
agencies when encountering a counselee with any of the following 
problems:238 
1) Counselee who has suicidal thoughts and actions:  when a 
person talks about his or her own death or funeral, the cleric 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 83 app.  This Appendix contains two Counseling 
Agreements entitled:  (1) Sample Adult Counseling Agreement; and (2) Sample Minor Counseling 
Agreement. 
 237. Id. at 76.  See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 116-17.  For a discussion of a pastoral or 
denominational counselor’s duty to investigate a parishioner counselee’s suicidal tendencies and 
make a referral to an appropriate professional, see Nally, 763 P.2d at 953-54, 957.  
 238. Fain, supra note 229, at 123-24.  See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 116-17. 
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should ask direct questions regarding the counselee’s thoughts 
of taking his or her own life.  The cleric should stay with the 
person, notify a family member, and recommend professional 
help.  Confidentiality may be breached when a person is 
suicidal. 
2) Counselee who talks a lot about near accidents:  This could 
indicate that the person has an emotional problem. 
3) Counselee who has alcohol and drug dependency problems. 
4) Counselee who abuses his or her children:  the cleric should 
inform the counselee that he or she must be reported to the 
state Child Protective Service Agency or other appropriate 
legal agency, because such conduct is illegal, and because the 
cleric cares about the family. 
5) Counselee who is being abused (child or spouse). 
6) Child-counselee who fails to perform to his or her capacity:  
he or she should be referred for appropriate therapy. 
7) Counselees who have extreme marital problems. 
8) Counselee who is having a lot of difficulty with life 
transitions. 
9) Counselee who is having serious problems related to puberty. 
10) Counselee who is having more than the normal difficulty 
developing relationships with the opposite sex. 
11) Counselee who is experiencing out of the ordinary family 
problems with older children. 
12) Counselee who is having unusual difficulty adjusting to a 
newborn child. 
13) Counselee who is having unusual difficulty with the empty 
nest syndrome. 
14) Counselee who is having extreme difficulty adjusting to 
retirement. 
● A Presbyterian minister, who established himself as an expert in 
pastoral care, has suggested a three-point test for determining 
whether a clergyperson should refer a counselee to a mental health 
professional or social worker.239  The cleric must ask himself or 
herself three questions: (1) do I have the time to work with the 
counselee as long as he or she needs assistance; (2) do I have the 
proper skills and training to handle the counselee’s problems;  and 
(3) do I have the emotional strength to deal with the counselee’s 
 
 239. Fain, supra note 229, at 123. 
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problems?240  If any of these questions are answered in the 
negative, the cleric should refer the counselee to a mental health 
professional, social worker or some other professional who has 
been trained to handle the counselee’s particular type of problem.241 
E.   Avoiding Particular Counseling Situations 
● In order to have more control over the counseling relationship and 
the circumstances involved, the person providing the pastoral 
counseling services to the counselee should seriously consider the 
suggestions below.  Adherence to these suggestions is likely to 
prevent liability producing conduct on the part of the pastoral 
counselor.242 
1) The counseling session, especially with the opposite sex, 
should be in clear view, perhaps in a room with a window or 
on a pew in the sanctuary as long as third persons are not able 
to hear the conversation.243 
2) A church staff member, the pastor’s wife or some other 
trustworthy third person of the same gender should “remain 
within easy line-of-sight with the counselor” for protection 
purposes without destroying the clergy-parishioner or 
counselor-counselee privilege.244 
3) If the counseling is conducted in a clearly visible open area or 
within the presence of a third party, emotional attachment will 
most likely be avoided, thereby safeguarding the pastor or 
counselor from groundless allegations of wrongful conduct.245 
4) If the person providing the counseling services adheres to the 
preceding suggestions, an adulterous relationship would most 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id.  A policy for handling complaints of alleged unethical professional conduct by 
clergypersons within the pastoral-parishioner relationship was developed in 1987 by the Northwest 
District of the American Lutheran Church.  It contained the following provision focusing on 
appropriate referrals as part of pastoral care: 
Referral is a vital subject to be learned.  Appropriate referral is pastoral care.  
Knowledge of the limits of one’s ability and time is a strength in ministry.  The pastor’s 
professional role and personal life are usually enhanced when his/her role is one of 
pastoral care, concern and spiritual nourishment while in-depth counseling is handled by 
an outside professional with whom the pastor is familiar.  How to refer in a helpful way 
is a learned skill appreciated by most laypeople. 
FORTUNE, supra note 34, at 152. 
 242. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 77-78. 
 243. Id. at 77. 
 244. Id. at 77-78. 
 245. Id. at 77. 
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likely be prevented because the pastoral counselor’s 
temptation for improper sexual activity may be eliminated.  It 
has been reported that 71% of extramarital affairs involving 
pastors began in connection with pastoral counseling 
sessions.246  
5) If the parent(s) of a minor-counselee is not home, then the 
pastoral counselor should not go into the child’s home.247 
6) The pastoral counselor should not engage in inappropriate 
touching with the counselee. 
7) The pastoral counselor should clearly communicate the 
church’s position that sexual or romantic relationships 
between counselors and counselees are “absolutely 
prohibited.”248 
8) The counselor must take the proper steps to guarantee 
“confidentiality of the counseling sessions.”249  
F.   Keeping Counseling Records250 
● Since the discussions that take place during counseling sessions are 
important in providing the counselee with appropriate spiritual 
guidance and in protecting the pastor or counselor from tort actions, 
thorough records of the sessions should be kept. Thorough records 
should include detailed notes containing the following data: 
1) Names of the persons present at the sessions and the reason(s) 
why they are there. 
2) Date, day and time of the sessions. 
3) Location of the sessions. 
4) Total number of the sessions. 
5) The counselee’s problem and the private nature of  the related 
matters addressed in the sessions. 
6) A “reasonable suspicion” on the counselor’s part or allegations 
made by the counselee during sessions concerning the 
occurrence of child abuse or violent behavior. 
7) Threats made by the counselee during a session(s) to injure 
himself or third persons. 
 
 246. Id. at 78. 
 247. Id. 
 248. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 78. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 79. 
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8) Behavior on the part of the counselee or statements made 
during one or more sessions indicating he or she is under the 
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs. 
9) Biblical advice provided during the sessions, including 
particular scriptures relied on as authority. 
10) The pastoral counselor’s specific recommendations to the 
counselee on how he or she should or should not handle the 
problems he or she is experiencing. 
● The pastoral counselor’s records of the counseling sessions should 
be placed in a confidential file which is not accessible to anyone 
other than the counselor. 
G.   Complying With State Licensing Laws251 
● The majority of state licensing laws do not apply to theological 
counselors unless they misrepresent their qualifications or use 
professional titles incorrectly. 
● Pastors should be careful to avoid violating any state laws that 
impose criminal penalties for:  (1) misrepresenting “themselves as 
being licensed by the state”;252 (2) misrepresenting “themselves as 
being professional marriage, family, or mental health professionals; 
[or] (3) [charging] . . . fees for their counseling services.”253 
H.   Procuring Professional Liability Insurance 
● Churches should procure “professional liability insurance” to 
protect pastors and other   church workers who commit negligent 
acts in carrying out their counseling responsibilities.  This type of 
insurance is also referred to as “errors and omissions insurance.”254 
● “Pastoral counseling” coverage should be included as a component 
of the church’s insurance policy for biblical or spiritual counseling 
errors (negligent acts or omissions). 255 
 
 251. Id. at 80. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 81. 
 255. Id. at 81.  See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 118.  See, e.g., Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.  The 
court in Nally referred to the availability of clergyman malpractice insurance intended “to protect 
against potential liability for spiritual counseling that causes injury.”  Id. 
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I.   Additional Ways Of Minimizing Church Counseling Liability 
● It has been suggested that the pastor or counselor put a limit on the 
number of counseling sessions, and include this restriction in the 
Counseling Agreement for the following reasons:256 
1) This limitation on the number of counseling sessions should 
guarantee that the pastor sets aside adequate time to handle 
other pastoral responsibilities. 
2) This limitation on the number of counseling sessions should 
reduce the danger of the relationship between the pastor and 
the counselee developing into one of intimacy or alienation. 
● It has been reported that many counselees leave their churches 
because they feel exposed or think they are being used as examples 
in sermons after being counseled over long periods of time.  
Limiting the number of counseling sessions may prevent this 
feeling of exposure on the part of counselees and prevent their 
ultimate withdrawal from their churches. 257 
● All counseling appointments should be written on a master calendar 
schedule to be used for upcoming meetings and as a business record 
of past meetings.  Since this type of schedule keeps the pastor’s 
staff aware of his or her location, the appearance of an 
“inappropriate secret rendezvous” between the pastor and the 
counselee would be avoided. 258 
● Churches should adopt a written counseling policy that restricts 
pastoral counseling to Biblical or spiritual guidance to protect 
against state control of pastoral counseling programs.259 
 
In sum, the recommendations listed above are designed to help 
pastors, churches and other religious organizations avoid or at least 
minimize their liability for clergy malpractice, negligent counseling and 
other tortious conduct; therefore, this writer believes that a good strategy 
would be to adopt these recommendations.  Historically, based on 
statistics, it has been observed that in times of emotional strain or 
anxiety more parishioners have sought counseling from their clerics than 
from other professionals, such as psychologists, social workers, 
psychiatrists, and other types of physicians.260  Apparently, many people 
 
 256. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 76-77. 
 257. Id. at 77. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 80-81. 
 260. Klee, supra note 34, at 219. 
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feel more comfortable and secure taking their problems to clergypersons 
than to unknown mental health professionals.261 Consequently, the cleric 
is able to get involved in the parishioner’s situation at an earlier stage 
than other professionals.262  Of course, financial limitations may also 
prevent many people from seeking other types of professional assistance.  
Since pastors are regularly being approached by congregants who need 
counseling services, churches should clearly see why due diligence 
should be utilized in the hiring of pastors and counselors by reasonably 
investigating their credentials, character, and overall fitness.  Pastors 
should restrict their assistance to spiritual guidance and avoid giving 
parishioners mental health, family, marital, or other types of counseling 
unless pastors have the proper credentials. 
Selectiveness by the pastor in deciding which persons to counsel 
and referral of certain individuals to the proper professionals to handle 
problems involving suicidal thoughts, alcohol dependency, drug abuse, 
child or spousal abuse, difficulty adjusting to a newborn child, or other 
severe difficulties is crucial for the protection of the church and pastor, 
and ultimately the counselee-parishioner.  Requiring that a written 
counseling agreement be signed by a counselee acknowledging that he is 
receiving Biblical counseling, not professional advice or guidance, and 
keeping detailed counseling records are critical in limiting lawsuits 
against the church, pastor, or counselor.  Ignoring state licensing laws 
applicable to counselors and representing oneself as having a license 
may lead to tort liability or the imposition of criminal penalties; 
therefore, pastors must be familiar with relevant laws.  Maintaining 
control over the counseling relationship and the circumstances involved 
is essential, because a failure to do so may lead to sexual misconduct, 
breach of confidentiality, or other legal or moral transgressions.  Finally, 
pastors and other church workers who commit negligent acts in carrying 
out their counseling responsibilities may be protected if churches obtain 
professional liability insurance.  Clearly, these and other strategies may 
be used effectively to safeguard churches, pastors, counselors and 
parishioners involved in church-related counseling services.  
 
 
 
 261. Id. at 220. 
 262. Id.   
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